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ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION WOULD IMPROPERLY 
EXPAND ALIMONY-TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS TO MANDATE 
A SHOWING OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE, AND EMOTIONAL AND 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN COHABITANTS 
Appellee claims that the Court of Appeals did not add a third prong to the two-
prong test for establishing cohabitation set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 
(Utah 1985). She then contradicts that assertion and goes on to declare that, in addition 
to the two-prong test, the Court of Appeals found the need for a third test, which, together 
with the two prongs of Haddow, "support the overarching idea that before alimony will 
be terminated, it is expected that the receiving spouse be engaged in a relationship that is, 
but for the license, a marriage, and concurrently the idea that the parties have begun to 
take responsibility for each other in both an emotional and economic sense." Apellee's 
Brief, p. 7. 
The notion that termination of alimony requires such an extreme showing is 
contrary to all prior Utah case law regarding alimony termination. Prior to the decision in 
Myers, there has never been a Utah case that would require both (1) the establishment of 
a common-law marriage and (2) mutual emotional and economic dependence between 
cohabitants, as prerequisites for terminating alimony. 
A. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE IRRELEVANT WHEN 
ALIMONY IS TERMINATED BY REASON OF REMARRIAGE OR 
COHABITATION 
Appellee claims that the third prong imposed by the Court of Appeals in Myers 
(which, according to Appellee, would require both a common-law marriage and 
economic and financial interdependence between the cohabitants) is necessary, because 
without it the courts would run the risk of allowing the receiving party to become a public 
charge. She argues that economic impact on the receiving party must be considered by 
the court in alimony termination decisions. Appellee's brief, pp. 7, 12, 17. 
As it currently stands, Utah law does not include any requirement that the courts 
analyze or consider the financial impact on the receiving party before terminating 
alimony for cohabitation or remarriage. 
While it is true that the Utah legislature has mandated that courts consider the 
parties' financial circumstances in establishing alimony (See Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 30-3-5), it has not included any economic consideration in its statutory scheme 
for terminating alimony on grounds of cohabitation or remarriage. Instead, the legislature 
has mandated that alimony terminate upon remarriage or cohabitation, regardless of the 
economic impact on the receiving party. See Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5. 
If the legislature had intended economics to be a consideration in terminating 
alimony for cohabitation or remarriage, it would have so specified, as it did when it 
outlined the standards for establishing alimony. The fact that it did not include any such 
economic considerations in alimony termination statutes indicates that it did not intend to 
have the courts analyze termination cases using an economic test. 
There are undoubtedly cases where a receiving party remarries, and her new 
spouse is unemployed and without any means of support. In such cases, the legislature 
has not mandated that alimony continue if the new spouse is unable to replace the 
alimony income, and the receiving spouse will become a public charge. Remarriage 
automatically terminates alimony, even if the result will make the former payee a public 
charge. Likewise, in cases where cohabitation is the basis for termination, the fact that 
the cohabitant is unable to support the receiving party is irrelevant. 
Myers is the only case that hints that alimony termination for cohabitation or 
remarriage should include an analysis of the receiving party's economic circumstances. 
Appellee and the Court of Appeals cited Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, 
190 P.3d 13 for such proposition. However, Ostermiller involved the standard for 
establishing, not terminating, alimony; and its decision and reasoning regarding alimony 
was overturned by the Utah Supreme Court in Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, 
233P.3d489. 
While it is a noble pursuit to prevent a person from becoming a public charge, 
personal responsibility and other public policy considerations apparently overrode 
financial protection for the receiving party, when the legislature decided on the standards 
for terminating alimony. Such considerations may have included the notion that an 
election to remarry or cohabitate is a significant decision; it imposes such long-lasting 
and potentially expensive costs on families and society that it should not be made lightly. 
Eliminating alimony as a consequence of remarriage or cohabitation serves to emphasize 
the importance of such a decision, and encourages parties not to make such decisions 
without careful thought. It penalizes them financially if they undertake such relationships 
without careful consideration. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CONFUSED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
NECESSARY FINDINGS AND SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
Appellee claims that the trial court's decision was not supported by the minimum 
facts necessary to justify its conclusions regarding common residency and sexual contact. 
In support of its argument, Appellee cite cases where Utah courts, in dicta, have 
made passing reference to the facts of those particular cases, which justified the trial 
courts' decisions, but which were not necessary for the trial courts to arrive at their 
decisions to terminate or continue alimony. 
For example, Appellee quotes, Sigg v. Sigg 905 P.3d 9087, 918 (UT App. 1995) 
for the proposition that sharing living expenses is a required element of establishing 
cohabitation. Sigg does not stand for any such proposition. 
In Sigg, the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's determination that there was 
sufficient evidence to establish cohabitation. In upholding the trial court's determination, 
the Court of Appeals recited a laundry list of facts that had been established in that case, 
and which more than justified the trial courts' decision (e.g., sharing living expense, 
having open access to each other's residences, eating together, keep clothing in each 
other residences, using the same furniture, etc.). By so doing, Sigg demonstrated that the 
trial court had more than a sufficient basis for terminating alimony (and thus did not 
abuse its discretion). It did not conclude or hold that in future cases trial courts must find 
all the facts established in Sigg to terminate alimony. It merely pointed out how the facts 
in Sigg went even farther than the minimum showing needed. In other words, those facts 
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were sufficient to terminate alimony, even though the absence of one or more of those 
facts would not necessarily have resulted in the continuation of alimony. The facts were 
sufficient, but not necessary. 
Where, as in Sigg, a trial court's discretion was upheld on appeal, not much can be 
concluded from the appellate decision regarding the minimum requirements needed to 
uphold the trial courts' ruling. The only conclusion to be gleaned from such cases is that 
the facts of those cases were more than sufficient to justify the trial court's decision. 
Cases which would be instructive regarding the minimum requirements for 
terminating alimony are those cases where the trial court was found to have abused it 
discretion by terminating or continuing alimony without a sufficient factual basis. If such 
cases were analyzed, they would demonstrate what missing element in the trial court's 
findings was a necessary fact that must be established to terminate alimony. Cases 
merely upholding a trial court tell us that the facts of that case were at least sufficient to 
terminate alimony; but they do not give us the ability to see the minimum facts needed to 
terminate alimony. 
In Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App. 377, the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's 
decision not to terminate alimony. It did so because it agreed with the trial court that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that a Mr. Andrews actually resided at the 
same location as the alimony recipient (wife). While it pointed out all of the factors that 
supported the trial court's decision (e.g., no continuity in residing together, no access to 
the home by the wife except as a visitor, not living as husband and wife, not moving all 
of her clothing or property to the home, maintaining another home in Brigham City 
where she lived for a great part of the time, and no sharing of living or food expenses), 
the Court of Appeals did not indicate how many of those missing factors needed to be in 
place for alimony to be terminated. Instead, it listed all of the facts that supported the 
trial court's decision. It found those facts to be sufficient to uphold the trial courts 
decision. Jensen is not helpful in deciding what minimum facts must exist to establish 
common residency or terminate alimony for cohabitation. 
While Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, 190 P.3d 13 did overturn a 
trial court's decision regarding alimony, that case involved alimony establishment, not 
termination; and Court of Appeals decision and reasoning on alimony was subsequently 
overturned by the Utah Supreme Court in Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, 233 
P.3d 489. That case is not helpful here. 
In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (UT App 1996), the trial court refused to 
terminate alimony because it did not find a common residence. Id. at 160. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and found that common residency existed. In 
that case, a common residence existed even though the cohabitant did NOT spend all of 
his nights at the same address as the wife (he spent only about four or five nights each 
week at the wife's home). The cohabitant also did NOT keep all his clothing at the 
wife's house (he kept some at a separate apartment and in his car); but that failure to keep 
all his effects at the wife's house did not negate a finding of common residency. The 
cohabitant in Pendleton did NOT assist in any way with the wife's living expenses or the 
cost of maintaining her home; but that fact did not negate common residency, according 
to the Court of Appeals. Pendleton demonstrates that failing to share living expenses, not 
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residing every night of the week with the wife, not having the wife's residence as the 
cohabitant's exclusive residence, and only keeping some of the cohabitant's personal 
effects and clothing at the wife's residence, do not negate common residency. Common 
residency existed in that case despite such missing factors. Id. at 161. 
Even Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), a case that overturned a trial 
court's decision, demonstrated the difference between a necessary element to establish 
cohabitation, and an element that, while supportive of cohabitation establishment, is not 
necessary to that determination. In Haddow the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the 
sharing of household expenses was NOT a "requisite element of cohabitation." It then 
went on to note, in passing dicta, that the sharing of household expenses was not present 
in the facts of that case. 707 P.2d at 673. In other words, if the sharing of household 
expenses was present, then that fact would support a conclusion of cohabitation; but the 
absence of such sharing would not negate cohabitation. 
Appellee would have the court convert non-necessary factors into necessary 
factors. She would have the court require that unless a payor can establish common law 
marriage and also show that the parties are financially and emotionally interdependent, 
alimony cannot be terminated, instead of requiring only a showing that the parties are 
cohabitating—i.e. residing in the same residence and having sexual contact typical of a 
marriage couple. 
The Court of Appeals, in Myers, adopted the extreme position advocated by 
Appellee, and converted non-necessary factors into factors that must be shown in all 
cases to terminate alimony. In so doing, it erred, and should be reversed. 
III. APPELLANT AGREES THAT THE BURDEN SHIFTING ELEMENT 
REMOVED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE IN 
THIS CASE, AS THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL 
CONTACT EVEN IF THE BURDEN DID NOT SHIFT 
The Court of Appeals was somewhat unclear in its analysis of the sexual contact 
prong of cohabitation. On one hand, it claimed that the existence or lack of sexual 
contact was not dispositive. 
On the other hand, it then went on to claim that the sexual contact prong may not 
have been met, and to opine that the legislature had shifted the burden of proof on that 
issue. 
If the Court of Appeals never reached the issue of sexual contact, then Appellant 
would agree that the issue is not dispositive, unless the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the parties did not share a common residence; in which case, the issue 
becomes a necessary part of the analysis. Even then, the issue would not be dispositive if 
there was sufficient evidence to establish sexual contact. 
As the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the parties did not share a 
common residence, the element of sexual contact must be considered here. 
In considering sexual contact, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to 
conclude that sufficient sexual contact existed to establish cohabitation, regardless of who 
bore the burden of proof on that issue. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, 107 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the sexual contact prong of cohabitation was met where there was only one 
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confirmed sexual encounter between the parties. In that case, the Court reviewed the 
facts, as follows: 
We first address the aspect of sexual contact. As noted above, the trial court found 
that Mr. Hudson spent the night with appellant an average of once a week. The 
findings do not indicate how long this conduct continued, but the record does 
show that at the time of trial, Mr. Hudson and appellant had been dating each 
other exclusively for about fourteen months. The court also found that appellant 
and Mr. Hudson had taken a vacation together to Hawaii, nsleeping in the same 
bed and having sexual relations," and that the couple had spent at least one night 
together in Elko, Nevada. So even if we disregard the possibility that sexual 
relations occurred on occasions when Mr. Hudson visited appellant's home but 
did not remain overnight, we are satisfied that the findings below on this point 
establish the presence of a relatively permanent sexual relationship. 
Id. at 672. 
Interestingly, in Haddow, the Supreme Court assumed that when the couple spent 
the night under the same roof they probably had sexual relations. Even though there was 
only one confirmed sexual encounter, the Supreme Court concluded that the sexual 
relationship was relatively permanent, based merely on the fact that the couple was 
together in the same residence overnight on many occasions. Apparently, sexual contact 
can be inferred from the romantic nature of a couple's relationship, when combined with 
overnight stays in the same residence. 
The sexual contact facts of Myers are remarkably similar to Haddow. As in 
Haddow, the evidence of sexual contact in Myers was largely circumstantial, based on the 
observations and lay opinions of witnesses regarding the nature and extent of the 
interaction between Appellee and her cohabitant. Nevertheless, from the nature of the 
relationship, and the many overnight stays the Myers cohabitants were together in an 
environment where their sexual interaction was not prevented, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the couple was engaged in a relatively permanent sexual relationship 
similar to that in Haddow, 
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 30-3-5(10) REGARDING ALIMONY 
TERMINATION IS AMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE. 
Appellee argues that Section 30-3-5(10) is plain and unambiguous and merely 
needs to be applied without any need for interpretation or analysis of legislature history. 
Appellee's brief, p. 16. As demonstrated in Appellant's initial brief, the meaning and 
application of that section to alimony termination cases is far from clear on the face of the 
statute. The legislature's failure to define "cohabitation," and its failure to outline any 
guidelines or process by which a payor is expected to "establish cohabitation" necessarily 
leaves courts grappling with legislative history, and results in courts imposing their own 
common-law meanings and processes on the parties for "establishing cohabitation," after 
analyzing that legislative history. 
Some of the questions raised by the language of the statute include (1) What is 
"cohabitation?" (2) Is "cohabitation" merely common residence—one possibility implied 
by the legislative history (and perhaps by Section 78B-7-102, Utah Code Ann.); or does it 
require something more? (3) Does the legislature's removal an explicit requirement for 
showing a long-term or permanent relationship from the final version of the statute, 
change the common-law requirement that the parties be in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship? (4) Does the process for "establishing cohabitation" merely incorporate the 
common-law burden shifting of Haddow (i.e., the payor "establishes cohabitation" by 
showing common residence, and the payee can then rebut that established cohabitation if 
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she shows lack of sexual contact, as Haddow indicated in its common-law process for 
"establishing cohabitation")? 
These, and perhaps other questions regarding the statute, are not answered merely 
by reading the language of the statute. 
V. REQUIRING THE PAYOR TO PROVIDE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF 
SEXUAL CONTACT WOULD IMPOSE AN UNTENABLE BURDEN ON 
HIM, EXCEPT IN THE SIMPLEST CASES, UNLESS THE EXTENT OF 
THE SHOWING NEEDED WAS LARGELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL OR 
INFERENTIAL. 
Appellee claims that removing the burden shifting would not impose an 
unreasonable burden on the payor. She then proceeds to cite many Utah cases where a 
payee admitted to sexual contact with a cohabitant, and argues that those cases 
demonstrate that payors will be able to meet a burden of establishing sexual contact 
without any difficulty. Appellee's brief, p. 19. 
While it is true that when a payee admits to the sexual contact, payor will be able 
to meet the burden of establishing sexual contact, those cases are not very significant or 
important in analyzing whether the burden is best placed on the payor or payee. In a 
world where sexual contact is admitted and witnesses do not lie, the burden of proof of 
sexual contact becomes meaningless. 
However, in the real world, where witnesses sometimes lie, and where payees seek 
to hide the sexual nature of the relationship with their cohabitant to avoid losing money, 
the burden of proving of sexual contact lies becomes critical. 
If that burden is placed on the payor, then unless the usually very private sexual 
acts between the cohabitants are publicly displayed before other witnesses, or admitted 
by the parties to the act, no direct evidence of the sexual relationship will be available to 
the payor. Although it may be clear that the payee is living with a romantic partner with 
whom she behaves as though she is intimately acquainted, unless she is caught red-faced, 
her alimony cannot be terminated if the burden of proof is placed on the payor. 
If, as in this case, the payor can establish that the parties are romantically involved 
and living under the same roof, he should be deemed to have established cohabitation. If 
the payee can subsequently establish lack of sexual contact, then she effectively rebuts 
the payor's establishment of cohabitation and inferred sexual contact. Such a process 
equitably balances the need for an effective means of proving cohabitation, while also 
assuring that alimony is not terminated if the payee is living with another person in a 
purely platonic, non-romantic relationship. It is also consistent with common-sense 
notions that romantically-involved persons who live under the same roof are probably 
engaging in sexual contact with each other. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the Court of Appeal's 
decision should be reversed, and the trial court's decision to terminate alimony should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j j £ day of ~Tfic+>ufifr* , 2011. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
GUY L. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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